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We analyze the time-series of prices in the Spanish electricity market by means of a time varying–
transition-probability Markov-switching model. Accounting for changes in demand and cost
conditions (which reflect changes in input costs, capacity availability and hydro power), we show
that the time-series of prices is characterized by two significantly different price levels. Using a
Cournot model among contracted firms, we characterize firms’ optimal deviations from a collusive
agreement, and identify trigger variables that could be used to discourage deviations. By interpreting
the effects of the triggers in affecting the likelihood of starting a price war, we are able to infer some
of the properties of the collusive strategy that firms might have followed.
JEL classification: C22; L13; L94
Keywords: Electricity markets; Tacit collusion; Markov switching
1. Introduction
During the last decade decentralized electricity markets have been created in Britain,
Norway, Sweden, the United States, Australia, Argentina, and Spain, to name but a few.T Correspon
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The details differ from country to country, but the different processes of reform share some
common features. These include the breaking up of the formerly vertically integrated
companies; the unbundling of generation, transmission, distribution and retailing; the
reliance on spot markets as a mean to allocate production and determine prices; and the
design of new institutional mechanisms to govern access to the transmission network.
This new form of regulation has raised concerns about the ability of electricity 
producers to exercise market power and its effects on the efficiency of the market. The 
recent empirical literature on market power in electricity markets is now vast. The studies 
have identified strategic bidding and output decisions by individual firms (Borenstein and 
Bushnell, 1999; Wolak, 2000, 2003; Wolfram, 1998) and have measured the departures of 
market outcomes from the competitive benchmark (Borenstein et al., 2002; Joskow and 
Kahn, 2002; Wolfram, 1999). All these studies have focused on the unilateral exercise of 
market power, but little attention has been devoted to analyze collusive attempts to 
exercise market power in a dynamic context.1 Nonetheless, electricity markets present 
several features that facilitate the sustainability of collusion more than most other markets: 
trading takes place on a daily basis and it is organized as a uniform-price auction,2 firms 
are capacity constrained, demand is very inelastic in the short-term, and there is typically a 
small number of players protected by high entry barriers. Both theory and experience 
suggest that these factors may allow firms to coordinate their strategies, and hence 
compete less aggressively with each other over time, through collusive agreements.
The analysis of the performance of the Spanish electricity spot market during 1998
provides a unique opportunity to perform an empirical analysis of firms’ dynamic
interaction. The availability of detailed data allows the use of changes in prices, firms’
market shares and cost fluctuations in order to identify potential attempts to exercise
market power in a dynamic context. Moreover, the analysis of this market uncovers
interesting effects regarding the link between firms’ bidding incentives and contract
positions. In the Spanish electricity market, firms are entitled to recover their stranded
costs through the so-called Competition Transition Costs (CTCs), which play a similar role
as contracts. In particular, given that CTCs are computed as a decreasing function of
market prices, they reduce firms’ incentives to raise prices. This effect is asymmetric
across firms, not only because firms’ market shares differ, but also because their (fixed)
shares over these payments are asymmetric. It is precisely this asymmetry that makes it
feasible to identify the effect of CTCs on firms’ bidding incentives.
Fig. 1 plots the time series of demand, prices and the estimated marginal costs and 
price-cost mark-ups in the Spanish electricity market from January 1998 to December 
1998. Prices show a systematic relationship with the evolution of demand and cost 
conditions throughout most of the time period. However, there are five to seven episodes 
in which prices fall below their usual prevailing levels. These price jumps seem to be 
uncorrelated with cost movements, as can be inferred from the series of price-cost mark-
ups. Furthermore, this pattern of prices is not consistent with the static models of price1
Puller’s (2000) empirical analysis of collusion in the Californian electricity market is an exception.
2 In a model applicable to electricity markets, Fabra (2003) shows that the sustainability of collusion is easier in 
uniform-price auctions as compared to discriminatory auctions.
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Fig. 1. Total demand, marginal costs, prices and price-cost mark-ups in the Spanish electricity market, 1998.competition in electricity markets (see Green and Newbery, 1992; von der Fehr and 
Harbord, 1993), as they predict a positive relationship between demand conditions and 
prices, after the differences in cost conditions have been taken into account.3 The outburst 
of these periods of intense rivalry thus seems to suggest that firms have followed more 
complex dynamic strategies than the simple repetition of the static one-shot equilibria.
The main goal of this paper is to empirically evaluate the plausibility of the above
conjecture. For this purpose, we first explore the incentive structure faced by the Spanish
electricity firms, both under Cournot competition and collusion. We focus on collusive
strategies that call firms to produce the monopoly quantity forever unless they observe
something that could signal a deviation; in such a case, they are called to revert to the
Cournot equilibrium for a finite number of periods before restoring collusion. The aim of
the theoretical analysis is two-fold: first, to identify the trigger variables that firms could
use to support collusion; and second, to predict how the movements in the trigger variables
should affect the probability of starting a price war.
Based on the theoretical predictions, we then model the pattern of pool prices by means
of an autoregressive Markov-switching model in the mean with time varying transition
probabilities. This process allows for distinct price-cycle phases, with the switching
probabilities depending on changes in market prices, firms’ market shares and revenues.
The statistical model thus enables us to test whether the pattern of prices is characterized3 Further evidence confirms that firms have not behaved so as to maximize their individual profits. In particular, 
the mark-ups of the over-contracted firm are positive during most of the sample, contradicting the predictions of 
the models that assume individual profit maximizing behavior among contracted firms (Newbery, 1998; Wolak,
2000).
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by different price levels, whether the effects of the trigger variables are statistically
significant, and whether the signs of these effects coincide with those predicted by the
theory.
Our results support the hypothesis that two distinct price levels characterize the time
series of prices in the Spanish electricity market during 1998. Furthermore, most of the
triggers considered appear significant and they report the predicted signs. In particular, the
probability of starting a price war increases when the market share and revenues of the
over-contracted (under-contracted) firm increase (decrease) and the market price increases
above its usually prevailing level. In summary, our results suggest that the Spanish
electricity producers might have been alternating between episodes of collusion and price
wars, consistently with the theoretical predictions.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide an overview of the
Spanish electricity industry and its market rules. In Section 3, we analyze a Cournot game
among contracted firms to understand firms’ incentive structure. Section 4 contains the
empirical analysis, including the data description, the empirical model, the summary of the
results, and their interpretation. Section 5 of the paper concludes.2. The Spanish electricity industry
In 1997, the Spanish electricity industry experienced fundamental changes.4 It evolved
from a system in which the allocation of output among the electricity producers was based
on yardstick competition to one that relied on market forces as a way of finding the most
economic use of the available resources. Under the current regulatory design, transactions
are organized through a series of sequential markets—primarily, the day-ahead market and
the intra-day markets- and technical processes governed by the System Operator.
The day-ahead market concentrates most of the transactions.5 All available production
units, excluding those already committed to a physical contract, must participate in it as
suppliers. They are asked to submit, each day on a day-ahead basis, the minimum prices at
which they are willing to make their generation available in each of the 24 hourly
markets.6 The demand side is comprised of the distributors, retailers, external agents and
qualified consumers, who are also required to submit the maximum prices at which they
are willing to consume electricity, and commit in a similar fashion as suppliers. On the
basis of these supply and purchase bids, the Market Operator constructs the industry
supply and demand curves, ranking the production and demand units in increasing and
decreasing merit order, respectively. The intersection between the industry supply and
demand curves determines the market clearing price (the so-called System Marginal Price4
The reforms were implemented through the Electricity Law 54/1997 of 27 November 1997. See Crampes and
Fabra (in press), Arocena et al. (1999) and Fabra Utray (2004) for an overview and discussion.
6 Sale and purchase bids can be made by considering from 1 to 25 energy blocks in each hour, with the
proposed price. The bid schedules have to be increasing (decreasing) in the quantity offered (demanded). The
supply bids can be simple, or they can include additional conditions, such as indivisibility, load gradient,
minimum income and scheduled shutdown.
5 In 1998, the daily market concentrated 99% of all the electricity traded.
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Table 1
Installed capacity by firm and technology (MW), 1998 (source: CNE, 2000)
Firm/technology Hydro Coal Fuel/gas Nuclear Total MW Shares
Endesa 6134 6684 3869 3185 19,872 45.6
Iberdrola 8175 1141 3258 3533 16,407 37.7
Unio´n Fenosa 1733 1972 784 765 5254 12.1
Hidrocanta´brico 410 1127 0 149 1686 3.9
Total MW 16,452 11,224 8231 7632 43,539 100.0
Capacity shares 37.8 25.8 18.9 17.5 100.0or SMP), which will be received (paid) by all suppliers (demanders) which offered to
produce (consume) at lower or equal (greater or equal) prices. The System Operator has
the responsibility of studying and solving the technical constraints that may have derived
from the day-ahead market. Closer to real time, the intra-day market sessions allow market
participants to fine-tune their positions previously undertaken in the day-ahead market.
The physical balance in the network between the production and the consumption of
electricity is ensured at all times by the System Operator through the ancillary services
markets and other technical processes.
The basic structure of the Spanish electricity industry was transformed during the 1990s
as a result of a consolidation process among the numerous regional electricity companies.7
The result was a highly concentrated industry, both horizontally and vertically.8
The two largest participants–Endesa and Iberdrola–control almost 80% of total
available generating capacity, and the remaining 20% is divided among two smaller
firms–Unio´n Fenosa and Hidrocanta´brico–and several fringe companies. Technology
mixes vary widely across firms: whereas Endesa owns more than half of total thermal
capacity, Iberdrola controls around a half of total hydro power. Table 1 summarizes the
capacity shares by company and technology type in the Spanish electricity market.
Generators have three main sources of revenues: market revenues, capacity payments,
and stranded cost recovery payments. Firstly, as already described, a generator may earn
revenues through the day-ahead, the intra-day and ancillary services markets. In these
markets, each generator’s revenue is given by the market clearing price in the relevant
demand period, times its quantity dispatched. Secondly, all the production units that
participate in the day-ahead market receive a capacity payment per unit of capacity
declared available. Given that firms earn capacity payments independently of their pricing
decisions, these payments should have had no impact on the pattern of prices. We will
therefore omit them from our analysis.97 Part of this consolidation process was government-led. One remarkable instance of this was the government’s
decision to strengthen Endesa prior to its privatization in 1996, by allowing it to acquire FECSA and Sevillana, 
which controlled 10% and 9% of total capacity, respectively (see Marı´n and Garcı´a-Dı´az, 2003).
9 As a robustness check, the empirical analysis was also carried out including the capacity payment (i.e. using
the final price rather than the spot market price). The results were essentially unchanged.
8 Distribution remains a regulated activity. In 1998, large customers (with annual consumption exceeding 15
GWh) were qualified to contract with a competitive retailer or to participate directly in the market. The volume of
electricity acquired by qualified consumers represented a very small fraction of the total market volume (1000
GWh versus 154,000 GWh over 1998).
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Last, the incumbent generators are entitled to recover their stranded costs through the so-
called Competition Transition Costs (CTC) during a 10-year period. The maximum amount
of these payments was computed as the difference between the net present value of the
revenues that firms were entitled to receive under the former regulatory regime and firms’
market expected revenues, under the assumption that the competitive market price would be
3.6 c/kWh on average. The amount of CTCs to be paid to the whole industry in a particular
year is computed as the difference between the total revenues earned through the regulated
tariff and the regulated costs.10 The Law 54/1997 established that this residual amount
would be shared among firms on the basis of some predetermined shares: 51.2% for
Endesa, 27.1% for Iberdrola, 12.9% for Unio´n Fenosa and 5.7% for Hidrocanta´brico.
Two conditions were imposed on the value of the CTCs to be received by a firm over
the transition period. First, if the average price received by a firm exceeded 3.6 c/kWh, the
extra revenues should be deducted from the firm’s maximum CTC entitlement. And
second, a firm’s CTC revenues could not exceed the maximum entitlement established by
the Law 54/1997. These two conditions imposed a price-cap and a price-floor on the pool
price. On the one hand, it would not be profitable for any firm to raise prices over 3.6 c/
kWh, as any increase in market revenues would be offset by the reduction in the firm’s
total CTC entitlement.11 On the other hand, it would not be profitable to reduce prices to a
level below one that allowed a firm to obtain its maximum entitlement, given that the
reduced market revenues would not be compensated by an increase in its CTC revenues.12
In the next section we present and solve a simple game that incorporates some of the
features of the Spanish electricity market that are relevant in understanding firms’ pricing
incentives.3. The theoretical framework
Consider an industry in which two firms simultaneously decide how much to produce,
qi, i=1, 2, at constant marginal costs cz0. The market price is determined as a function of
firms’ quantity choices, P(q1+q2), where P (d ) is the inverse demand function, which is
decreasing in the total quantity produced. Furthermore, we assume that firm i=1, 2 is
entitled to receive an extra-payment [sP( qi+qj)]ai, where s is a fixed tariff and ai is
firm i’s (exogenously given) contracted quantity. Firms’ contract positions are taken as a
proxy for CTCs. We will assume P(a1+a2)Nc.10 Mainly, payments to distributors (who are reimbursed their costs of buying electricity in the spot market plus a
rate of return), payments for transmission, payments to generators in the so-called Special Regime (mainly,
renewables and cogenerators) and subsidies for burning national coal.
11 This assertion is valid as long as firms do not discount the future stream of profits very strongly, and as long as
they perceive full regulatory certainty about the payment of their total CTC entitlements. This second concern
started to play a role from 1999 onwards, when the European Commission opened up an investigation to
determine whether the CTCs were State Aids, in which case they would have been banned.
12 The maximum amount of CTCs was fixed at 11,951.5m, 1774.6 of which were subsidies to national coal, and 
the rest was the maximum amount to be divided among the incumbent firms. In 1998, firms perceived CTCs 
which amounted to 633.5m. The maximum entitlements of Endesa and Iberdrola were reduced by o67.5m and 
o47.15m, respectively, because their average prices exceeded 3.6 co/kW h. See CNE (2000) for a more detailed 
description.
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First, assume that firms choose their quantities non-cooperatively. Firm i’s profit
maximization problem given an output level qj of the rival firm, i=1, 2, ip j, is:
13
max
qiz0
pi qi; qj
  ¼ P qi þ qj  c qi þ s  P qi þ qj  ai
An optimal quantity choice for firm i given its rival’s output must therefore satisfy the
first-order condition:
P V qi þ qj
 
qi  ai½  þ P qi þ qj
  c ¼ 0 ð1Þ
For each qj, we let Ri(qj) denote firm i’s best response function. A pair of quantity choices
(q1*,q2*) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if these quantities satisfy the first-order condition
(1) for the two firms.
Second, assume that firms choose quantities so as maximize joint profits. Their
maximization problem is given by:14
max
qz0
pm qð Þ ¼ P qð Þ  c½ qþ s  P qð Þ½  a1 þ a2½ 
The monopoly quantity, denoted qm, must satisfy the first-order condition:
P V qmð Þ qm  a1 þ a2ð Þ½  þ P qmð Þ  c ¼ 0 ð2Þ
Therefore, any quantity profile ( q1
m,q2
m) such that q1
m+q2
m=qm would allow firms to
attain monopoly profits. However, as shown in Proposition 1 below, unless each firm’s
production at the monopoly solution equals its contracted quantity, i.e., qi
m=ai, i=1, 2,
firms will have unilateral incentives to deviate. Proposition 1 further explores the
conditions under which a firm will optimally deviate from the monopoly solution by either
reducing or increasing output.
Proposition 1. From any quantity profile (q1
m,q2
m) such that q1
m+q2
m=qm, firm i’s optimal
deviation is to reduce output if and only if the rival is over-contracted at the monopoly
solution. Formally, Ri (qj
m)bqi
mfqj
mbaj.
Proof.We proceed by comparing the marginal profit functions (1) and (2). Graphically, we
want to assess whether the slope of the tangent to a firm’s individual profit function
evaluated at the monopoly quantities is upward or downward sloping.
Extracting (2) from (1) evaluated at ( qi
m,qj
m), for i=1, 2, ip j, we obtain
Bpi qmi ; q
m
j
 
Bqi

Bpm qmi þ qmj
 
Bqi
¼  P V qmð Þ  qmj  aj
h i
:
Given that the first-order condition for the monopolist is satisfied with equality,
and given that PV(q)b0, it follows that firm i’s marginal profit function is downward13 We assume that the objective function is concave in qi so that satisfaction of first order condition is sufficient
for Ri( qj) to be firm i’s optimal choice given the production of its rival.
14 Again, we assume that the objective function is concave in q so that satisfaction of first order condition is
sufficient for qm to be an optimal choice.
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sloping at ( qi
m,qj
m) if and only if the rival firm is over-contracted at the monopoly
solution, i.e.,
Bpi qmi ; q
m
j
 
Bqi
b0fqmj baj:
From the concavity of the profit function, it follows that a firm facing an over-
contracted rival deviates from the monopoly solution by reducing output. Note that in a
standard game with no contract positions, qj
mNaj=0. Hence, in the absence of contracts,
we obtain the standard result that a firm’s best response is always to increase output.
5
To illustrate our previous results, suppose that the demand function takes the linear
form P(q)=1q1q2. Assumption P(a1+a2)Nc implies 1a1a2N0.
Using (2), the monopoly outcome is characterized by
qm ¼ 1þ a1 þ a2
2
P qmð Þ ¼ 1 a1  a2
2
pm ¼ 1 a1  a2
2
	 
2
þ s a1 þ a2½ 
Similarly, using the first-order condition (1), we find that firm i’s reaction function is15
Ri qj
 
: qi ¼ 1 qj
2
þ ai
2
; i ¼ 1; 2; ipj: ð3Þ
Solving the system of reaction functions, the Cournot equilibrium outcome is
characterized, for i=1,2, by
q4i ¼
1 aj þ 2ai
3
P q4i ; q
4
j
 
¼ 1 a1  a2
3
pi q
4
i ; q
4
j
 
¼ 1 ai  aj
3
	 
2
þ sai:
By comparing the monopoly and the Cournot solutions, note that the monopoly price
exceeds the Cournot price. Nevertheless, whenever firms’ contracted quantities are
sufficiently large, i.e., a1+a2N1/3 , collusion among contracted firms yields lower prices15 Note that a firm’s contracted quantity shifts its reaction function out, but does not affect its slope.
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than Cournot competition among non-contracted firms. That is, contracts make colluding
firms more aggressive, even absent price wars.
To analyze whether a deviant firm increases or decreases its production with respect to
the monopoly solution, we extract qi
m from the reaction function (3) evaluated at qj
m:
Ri q
m
j
 
 qmi ¼
qmj  aj
2
Hence, as stated in Proposition 1 above, the optimal deviation involves reducing output
if the rival firm is over-contracted.
Last, we are interested in identifying the observable consequences of firms’ optimal
deviations. Building on Proposition 1, if a firm facing an over-contracted rival deviates, it
would do so by reducing its output. Such a deviation would cause a reduction in its market
share, an increase in prices, and accordingly, an increase in its rival’s market revenues.
Similarly, if a firm facing an under-contracted rival deviates, it would do so by increasing
output. Such a deviation would cause an increase in its market share, a reduction in prices,
and accordingly, a reduction in its rival’s market revenues.
The following corollary summarizes these effects.
Corollary 1. Index firms such that firm 1 is over-contracted and firm 2 is undercontracted,
i.e., q1
mba1 and q2
mNa2:
(i) An optimal deviation by either firm would cause a reduction (increase) in firm 2’s
(firm 1’s) market share. If q1
mNq2
m; it would also lead to an increase in the
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (i.e., the sum of the squared market shares).
(ii) An optimal deviation by firm 1 would reduce prices and firm 2’s market revenues.
An optimal deviation by firm 2 would increase prices and firm 1’s market revenues.
3.1. Empirical predictions
The Cournot model developed above allows us to derive some empirical 
predictions. From Fig. 2, note that Endesa is over-contracted, that Iberdrola is 
under-contracted, and that Endesa’s production exceeds Iberdrola’s during most of the 
sample. Hence, applying Corollary 1, the empirical findings listed below would be 
consistent with firms following some sort of collusive strategy that calls firms to compete 
fiercely with each other only after observing something that could signal a deviation (in 
the right direction).
Changes in firms’ market shares: The probability of starting a price war increases
following a reduction in Iberdrola’s market share and an increase in Endesa’s market share.
Equivalently, price wars are more likely following an increase in the HHI.
Changes in prices and firms’ market revenues: If a price increase makes a price war
more likely, an increase in Endesa’s market revenues should also increase the probability
of starting a price war. Alternatively, if a price reduction makes a price war more likely, a
reduction in Iberdrola’s market revenues should also increase the probability of starting a
price war.9
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Fig. 2. Endesa’s and Iberdrola’s market shares, CTC shares and mark-ups, 1998.Note that the first (second) of the two predictions concerning the movements in
prices and firms’ market revenues would be consistent with a collusive strategy
designed to discourage Iberdrola (Endesa) from deviating, given that an optimal
deviation by Iberdrola (Endesa) would lead to a price increase (decrease). On the
contrary, we could unambiguously conclude that firms are not following the type
of collusive strategies analyzed above if the empirical findings contradict at least
one of the above predictions—for instance, if price wars are more likely following
price decreases (increases) and increases (decreases) in Iberdrola’s (Endesa’s) market
share.4. The empirical analysis
4.1. Data description
For the empirical analysis, we will be using detailed daily data on price, quantities and
other variables, some of which are expressed at the industry level, at the firm level, or at
the plant level. The sample covers the period from January 1998 through December 1998.
Among our variables, we will use the daily aggregate industry production and the daily
quantities produced by Endesa and Iberdrola, which we will denote by Qt, Qt
END and Qt
IB,
respectively. All the quantity variables are measured in MWh. Our price variable is
denoted SMPt, which represents the demand-weighted average price in the daily market; it
is measured in co/kWh.10
In addition, we have constructed estimates of marginal costs and mark-ups (Borenstein 
et al., 2002; Joskow and Kahn, 2002; Wolfram, 1999 use similar estimation techniques). 
For this purpose, we have first derived the shot-run thermal cost curve at the firm level by 
estimating the marginal production costs for each generating plant, on a daily basis.16 The 
short-run marginal costs of a thermal plant (including nuclear, coal, oil and natural gas 
plants) depend on the type of fuel it burns, the cost of the fuel, the plant’s heat rate (i.e., the 
efficiency rate at which each plant converts the heat content of the fuel into output), and 
the short-run variable cost of operating and maintaining the plant (O&M).17 We have 
assumed that the costs of the fossil-fuels are those negotiated daily in the international 
input markets.18 In addition, to calculate the cost of the coal plants, we have added an 
estimate of transportation costs based on the distance between each plant and the nearest 
harbor where coal is delivered. Last, we have assumed that the available capacity of each 
plant equals its average availability over a given month in those days in which the plant 
was not subject to scheduled maintenance or forced outages; a plant’s available capacity is 
assumed to be zero otherwise.19 By aggregating the capacities of a firm’s thermal plants in 
increasing cost order, we obtain an estimate of its thermal cost curve in a given day (see 
Fig. 3).
To obtain hourly marginal cost estimates, we need to intersect each firm’s thermal 
cost curve with its thermal production in every hour, i.e., its total production net of its 
hydro production. For this purpose, we need to assume how firms allocate total hydro 
production during the day, given that we lack information on the hourly figures. Our 
data set distinguishes between each firm’s daily pondage hydro and run of the river. 
Whereas firms can choose when to allocate the former, they cannot choose when to 
produce with the latter. Hence, we have allocated run of the river production evenly over 
the day. For pondage hydro, we have assumed that firms use it non-strategically and 
allocate it to high demand hours. This results in firms equalizing thermal production 
across the hours in which they allocate pondage hydro power, i.e., firms peak-shave 
each hour. Bushnell (2003) finds that strategic firms may have an incentive to increase16 There are intertemporal and operational constraints that affect firms’ costs (e.g. start-up costs or ramping
rates). Our cost estimation does not take these into account (see Borenstein et al., 2002 for a discussion of how 
this could affect the estimates).
17 The information on the types of fuel burned by each plant, together with their heat rates and operating and
maintenance costs, has been obtained from Red Ele´ctrica de Espan˜a (REE is the Spanish Transmission Owner and
System Operator).
18 We have not considered firms’ obligation to burn domestic coal, and the subsidies obtained from so doing. For
coal units, we use the MCIS Index, for fuel units we use the F.O. 1% CIF NWE prices, and for gas units we use
the Gazexport–Ruhrgas prices. All series are in co/te. We have obtained this information from UNESA (the
Spanish National Union of Electricity companies). For nuclear plants, we have assumed a fixed input cost equal to
0.5 co/te; this does not affect the results as nuclear plants are never marginal.
19 In a study of the British electricity market, Wolfram (1999) assigns each plant a capacity below its declared 
capacity to capture the strategic withholding aimed at increasing capacity payments (Patrick and Wolak, 1997). In 
the Spanish electricity market, capacity payments are fixed per MW declared available, implying that firms do not 
have incentives to under-declare their available capacities. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the scheduling of 
planned outages for maintenance may be subject to strategic considerations (e.g. it may be profitable to shift 
scheduled outages from off-peak to on-peak periods, see Patrick and Wolak, 1997 for evidence on this).
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Fig. 3. Representative thermal cost curves at the firm level (on 27/12/98).hydro production in off-peak hours, rather than on-peak hours, thereby distorting the
efficient use of hydro resources. Our methodology does not fully exclude this kind of
strategic behavior given that we only assume non-strategic hydro allocation over the
course of a day, i.e., firms could still be strategically allocating hydro over the year.
Accordingly, we do not expect that the assumed peak-shaving procedure would
considerably bias our cost estimates (or at least to the extent that the qualitative nature of
the results would be reversed).
Since we will be using daily figures, we have computed demand-weighted marginal 
cost estimates. In the empirical analysis, we will be using marginal cost estimates for 
Endesa and Iberdrola only, these are denoted MCt
END and MCt
IB. We have also computed 
firms’ price-cost mark-ups, which are denoted Markupt
END and Markupt
IB for Endesa 
and Iberdrola (see Fig. 2).
We have constructed additional variables aimed at capturing firms’ strategic behavior.
The choice of these variables is based on the theoretical discussion presented in Section 3.
The variables DShareENDt1 and DShare
IB
t1 are intended to capture a plausible trigger in an
industry geared by a collusive agreement that switches to a price war when a firm’s market
share suffers a suspiciously large change (either positive or negative). They are measured
as percentage changes in the firm’s market share with respect to the previous period’s
value (lagged one period). The trigger variable DHHIt1, which represents the one period
lagged value of changes in the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (i.e., the sum of the squared
market shares of all firms in the industry), captures the changes in all firms’ market shares.
The variables DRevENDt1 and DRev
IB
t1 are intended to capture a similar trigger, based on
changes in firms’ market revenues. Last, we consider the lagged changes in the weekly
average price, DS¯MPt1.
The changes in firms’ market shares and revenues shares depict a strong weekly
seasonal component that would enter into the definitions of the trigger variables. In order12
Table 2
Summary statistics
Mean Variance Min Max
Qt 423.35 47.462 305.95 524.50
Qt
END 195.91 26.412 119.17 257.60
Qt
IB 131.06 19.769 89.480 190.88
SMPt 2.5525 0.3891 0.97613 3.1791
MCt
END 2.5124 0.3914 1.2500 3.2830
MCt
IB 2.4592 0.3577 1.3270 3.1098
Markupt
END 0.01310 0.2415 1.0229 0.5645
Markupt
IB 0.00176 0.2671 1.8256 0.5494
DShareENDt1 0.0005 0.0210 0.09159 0.0992
DShareIBt1 0.0008 0.0300 0.11032 0.1344
DHHIt1 0.0002 0.0124 0.03820 0.0410
DS¯MP t1 0.0021 0.1712 0.53367 1.0237
DRevENDt1 0.0016 0.1643 1.0392 0.9913
DRevIBt1 0.0027 0.1426 0.73729 0.7650
DShareENDw 0.0023 0.0221 0.0601 0.0556
DShareIBw 0.0023 0.0374 0.1059 0.1031
DHHIw 0.0014 0.0096 0.0236 0.0284
DS¯MPw 0.0508 0.2860 0.5336 1.0237
DRevw
END 0.0408 0.2956 1.0392 0.9913
DRevw
IB 0.0490 0.2327 0.7372 0.7650
Distt
IB 170.84 22.297 115.04 230.33
Availt 16.812 0.5276 15.805 17.772
Variable definitions: Qt: aggregate industry production, Qt
END and Qt
IB: Endesa’s and Iberdrola’s production,
SMPt: System Marginal Price; MCt
END and MCt
IB: firms’ marginal costs; Markupt
END and Markupt
IB: firms’ price-
cost mark-ups; DShareENDt1 , DShare
END
t1 , and DHHIt1: changes in firms’ market shares and changes in the HHI
concentration index, DS¯MP t1: changes in the weekly average price; DRevENDt1 and DRev
IB
t1: firms’ revenue
changes; the subscript w denotes that statistics are computed on a five period window prior to observing negative
mark-ups for Endesa; Distt
IB: Iberdrola’s distribution, and Availt: available thermal capacity.to only consider their unexpected changes, the associated trigger variables have been
constructed on deseasonalized values of production levels and revenues.20
4.2. Summary statistics
Table 2 provides summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis. The first four 
rows of Table 2 contain the summary statistics for the aggregate industry production, the 
production of the individual companies, and prices. Notably, prices are highly volatile, and 
their drops are more pronounced than their increases. The minimum price recorded 
(0.9761 co/kWh) implies a drop of over 50% in relation with its mean value, whereas the 
maximum price recorded (3.1791 co/kWh) implies an increase of no more than 25%.20 The deseasonalization is implemented using an unobserved component model. This model is estimated in the
series of production and revenues of each of the generators and the Kalman filter is used to extract the different
components. A local trend model with trigonometric seasonal and an irregular component is chosen as the
benchmark specification. The estimated models are available from the authors upon request.
13
The next four rows in Table 2 include summary statistics for marginal costs and the price-
cost markups of Endesa and Iberdrola. Whereas the volatility of firms’ marginal costs does 
not differ much from that of prices, the minimum marginal costs registered imply that the 
percentage reductions in marginal costs in relation with the mean are much smaller than 
those for prices. This seems to suggest that the price declines are not induced by proportional 
reductions in marginal costs. Indeed, the price-cost markups for both firms record negative 
values, attaining drops of 180% in the case of Iberdrola and maximum increases around 50%
for both companies (the timing of these extreme values can be seen in Fig. 2).
The next six rows record statistics for the trigger variables. Though the changes of most
of these variables seem to average zero, they are characterized by a high variance.
Percentage changes in the market share of Endesa and Iberdrola can attain values of
around 10% from one day to the other, both in the downside and in the upside. Percentage
changes in the market revenues of both companies can have swings of over 90% for
Endesa, and well above 70% for Iberdrola.
As a prior check out of whether the trigger variables can precede, and in some way 
explain, the price declines, we have calculated summary statistics for these variables for 
the 5 days prior to the occurrence of negative price-cost markups for Endesa. These 
summary statistics are presented in rows 15 to 20 in Table 2, and are denoted with the 
subscript w.21 The results suggest that price declines are related to the variables we have 
chosen as triggers: changes in firms’ market shares, changes in prices, and changes in 
firms’ market revenues. In those periods preceding Endesa’s negative markups, there is an 
increase in the average percentage change of Endesa’s market share as compared with the 
values obtained when using the whole sample period (0.0023 versus 0.0005). Also, there 
is a sharper drop in the change of Iberdrola’s market share (0.0023 versus 0.0008). 
Moreover, the average drop in prices is more pronounced in periods preceding negative 
markups of Endesa as compared with the average change in prices computed for the whole 
sample period (0.0508 versus 0.0021). Last, these facts translate into sharper changes 
in firms’ revenues (0.0408 versus 0.0016 for Endesa, and 0.0490 versus 0.0027 for 
Iberdrola).
The last two rows of Table 2 include statistics for the demand distributed by Iberdrola 
and the available thermal capacity in the industry. These two variables will be used as 
instrumental variables in the empirical model, which we describe next.
4.3. The empirical model
As our statistical model we will consider an autoregressive Markov-switching model in
the mean with time varying transition probabilities (TVTP). The TVTP model
encompasses the fix transition probability model (FTP), as it may allow the switching
probabilities to either change or not change over time. Furthermore, in contrast to the FTP
in which the expected duration of a phase of low/high prices is constant, the TVTP is
linked to the notion of time-varying duration in the Markov-switching framework.21 We thank the Editor for suggesting this idea. Similar statistics were calculated for the 5 days prior to negative
markups by Iberdrola. The results, which are close to those reported here, are available from the authors upon
request.
14
The autoregressive TVTP Markov-switching model of prices allows for distinct price-
cycle phases (collusive price phase/price war phase) with state-dependent means, and for
dynamics of prices with the lagged predetermined variables.22 The state of prices is not
known with certainty. The econometrician can neither observe the state of prices nor
deduce the state directly. These states are assumed to be path dependent and evolve
according to a first-order Markov process with TVTP coefficients. The TVTP model with
state-dependent mean can be presented as:23
SMPt ¼ lSt þ bZt þ vst
lSt ¼ l0 1 Stð Þ þ l1St
St ¼ 0; 1: ð4Þ
where SMPt is the system marginal price in period t; lSt is the mean of prices in state St;
which can either be a collusive state, St=0, or a price war state, St=1 (i.e., l0zl1), and Zt
is a group of variables that are likely to influence prices and measured as deviations from
their means.
The stochastic process for St can be summarized by the following transition probability:
P St ¼ stjSt1 ¼ st1;wt1ð Þ;
where st is a possible realization of the random variable St. We assume serial correlation of
the states (e.g. a collusive period is likely to be followed by another collusive period). The
variable wt1 is likely to influence the transition probabilities, and it is henceforth referred
to as dtrigger variableT.24,25
The matrix of transition probabilities that governs the stochastic process is given by:
Kt1 ¼ q wt1ð Þ 1 p wt1ð Þ1 q wt1ð Þ p wt1ð Þ

;

ð5Þ22
In this respect, we depart from Ellison (1994) since he allows for autoregressive residuals, which in our view
could be a sign of misspecification because of the omission of lagged dependent variables.
24 Two issues need to be stressed. First, we have explicitly written lagged wt1, because the theory predicts that
firms should react immediately after they observe an anomalous behavior of the trigger variables. And second, it
might be reasonable to allow the transition probability p(wt1) to depend on the number of periods firms have
been in a price war, i.e. on duration, dt1. We are aware that omitting the dependence of p(wt1) on dt1 might
lead to inconsistent estimates of the response of wt1 on p. This should not affect our main results however. We
are only interested in determining the probability of entering into a price war, 1q(wt1); which should not be
dependent on duration.
25 In order to obtain consistent and normally distributed estimates from our maximum likelihood estimators, the 
trigger-variables chosen should be conditionally uncorrelated with the states, given the current prices (see Engle et 
al., 1983; Filardo, 1994). This would allow us to estimate consistently our TVTP model using jointly the 
conditional maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) and the filtering methods proposed in Hamilton (1989). This is 
the case of our trigger variables.
23 Eq. (4) could include the trigger-variables (wt1). However, we formulate our model with the trigger-variables
influencing only the transition probabilities, to emphasize the contribution of the TVTP on the price dynamics.
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where q(wt1)=P(St=0|St1=0; wt1) and p(wt1)=P(St=0|St1=1; wt1). In words,
q(wt1) captures the probability of being in a collusive state (St=0) given that the previous
period was a collusive state (St1=0) and given the values recorded for the trigger variable
in the previous period (wt1). That is, the probability of switching to a given state
(collusion/price war) depends on the given state and the value of the trigger variable in the
previous period.
In searching for a particular functional form of the transition probabilities, we will use
the logistic function:26
P St ¼ kjSt1 ¼ l;wt1ð Þ ¼
exp klk;0 þ klk;1wt1
 
1þ exp klk;0 þ klk;1wt1
  ; l; k ¼ 0; 1:
where (klk, l, k=0, 1) are unrestricted parameters. We are interested in characterizing the
probability of starting a price war. This is given by
1 q wt1ð Þ ¼ P St ¼ 1jSt1 ¼ 0;wt1ð Þ ¼ 1
exp k00;0 þ k00;1wt1
 
1þ exp k00;0 þ k00;1wt1
  : ð6Þ
Thus the parameter estimate k00,1 reflects the influence of wt1 on 1q(wt1).27
With autoregressive dynamics of order 1 the conditional density distribution of SMPt,
given St, St1, SMPt1, wt1 and Zt, is defined by f, and can be written as:
f SMPtjSt; St1; SMPt1;wt1;Ztð Þ
¼
X1
st¼0
X1
st1¼0
f SMPt; St ¼ st; St1 ¼ st1jSMPt1;wt1;Ztð Þ
¼
X1
st¼0
X1
st1¼0
f SMPtjSt ¼ st; St1 ¼ st1; SMPt1;wt1;Ztð Þ
P St ¼ st; St1 ¼ st1jSMPt1;wt1;Ztð Þ
¼
X1
st¼0
X1
st1¼0
f SMPtjSt ¼ st; St1 ¼ st1; SMPt1;wt1;Ztð Þ
P St ¼ stjSt1 ¼ st1;wt1ð ÞP St1 ¼ st1jwt1ð Þ26 As in binary response models different specifications are available for mapping the index function
(k lk ,0+k lk ,1wt1, k, l=0, 1) into a probability. We could have tried other alternatives for our transformation
function ( F(d )) such as a normal or a Cauchy cumulative distribution function instead of the logistic specification
chosen. However, we have preferred the latter specification since it is more tractable. For the normal and Cauchy
cumulative distribution function there is no close form expression for F(x) and it has to be evaluated numerically.
This would have increased the amount of calculations in the type of models that we use in the paper which are
already very computer intensive.
27 Note that the sign of marginal effect of wt1 on the probability of starting a price war will have the opposite
sign as the E00,1s.
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and the likelihood function is:
L hð Þ ¼
XT
t¼1
ln f SMPtjSMPt1;Zt;wt1; hð Þ;
where h are the parameters of interest. The states are unobserved by the econometrician 
and the filter developed in Hamilton (1989) is used to jointly estimate the parameters of 
the model and the process governing the states.
In order to analyze the pattern of prices in the Spanish electricity market, we will
estimate a supply equation of the form,
SMPt ¼ b0 þ b1MCENDt þ b2MCIBt þ b3QENDt þ b4QIBt þ b5QRt : ð7Þ
Our supply equation defines SMPt as function of a constant, b0, the marginal cost of the
main generators, MCt
END and MCt
IB; their production levels, Qt
END and Qt
IB, and the
residual demand not served by them, Qt
R=[QtQtENDQtIB] (i.e., covered through
imports, the production of the non-strategic firms, etc.).
Our previous discussion suggests that in the Spanish electricity market the SMPt might
be better characterized by a changing mean, with two different price levels, and that the
dynamics of switching from one price state to the other might be influenced by some
strategic variables. In order to formulate Eq. (7) as in (4), we express the variables in
deviations from their means and allow the mean of prices to fluctuate between two states.
Last, we introduce autoregressive dynamics to allow for cross-price effects. This results in
our equation of interest,
SMPt  lSt ¼ q SMPt1  lSt1
 þ bZt þ vst ð8Þ
where b is the vector of parameters in the linear part of the model, Zt=[MCt
END
E(MCt
END), MCt
IBE(MCtIB), QtENDE(QtEND), QtIBE(QtIB), QtRE(QtR)]V is the
corresponding vector of variables measured in deviations from their means, the
term vt
s~N(0,rs) captures innovations or shocks unmodelled in our supply equation
and lSt denotes the time varying mean of prices, where St denotes the state, with St=0
if t is a collusive period (high prices), and St=1 if t belongs to a price war (low
prices).
Note that there could be three potential sources of endogeneity of the Zt variables. The 
demand not served by the strategic firms, Qt
R, and the quantities they produce, Qt
END and 
Qt
IB, are likely to be correlated with innovations in our price Eq. (8). In order to address 
this endogeneity problem we respectively instrument these variables with weekend 
dummies, the available thermal capacity in the industry, and the demand distributed by 
Iberdrola (see Table 2 for summary statistics of these variables). These are all valid 
instruments as they are correlated with the corresponding variables but unrelated with 
innovations in prices. The weekend dummies capture most of the variation of the demand 
not served by the strategic firms and they are unrelated with innovations in prices. 
Moreover, the thermal available capacity should be correlated with Qt
END and uncorrelated 
with innovations in prices. Last, the amount distributed by Iberdrola should be related to 
Qt
IB and unrelated with innovations in prices (the amount served by any distributor is 
independent of wholesale prices as final consumers pay a regulated tariff, set in advance).17
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e4.4. The results and their interpretation
In our empirical analysis we consider six models that differ in the variables that are
used as triggers. The different models are labelled from 1 to 6, corresponding to the use of
DSharet
EN
1
D, DSharet
IB
1, DHHIt1, D¯SMPt1, DRevt
END
1 an
DRevt
IB
1, r e s p e c t i v e l y .  Estimates are computed by numericall
maximizing the conditional likelihood.28 Table 3 reports results for our set of models. Th
signs of the coefficients associated with the relevant variables are as expected. Increases i
the marginal costs of Endesa and Iberdrola induce an increase in prices, as reported by th
positive signs of b1 and b2. The coefficient of the Endesa’s production (b3) is strongl
significant and reports a positive coefficient. The point estimate of the coefficient associate
with Iberdrola’s production (b4) reports a negative sign, though a confidence interva
constructed at the 5% level of significance would also include positive values as well as zero
Finally, the demand not served by the two main generators is strongly significant and th
negative sign of b5 is consistent with the predictions of the model.
Table 3 presents enough evidence to support the hypothesis that two distinct price
levels characterize the time series of prices. The point estimates of the state-dependent
means are statistically different and their magnitudes differ statistically and economically
according to the asymptotic standard errors. The sample dichotomizes in two phases that
exhibit a low (price war phase) and a high price (collusive phase), given the technology
and production information embodied in Eq. (8).
Table 3 also lists the estimates for the transition probability equation. All of the points
estimates of the k00,0 and k11,0 parameters are statistically significant at the 5% level; but 
some of the points estimates of the E00,1 and k11,1 parameters are not significantly different 
from zero. Nevertheless, a test for joint significance of these point estimates rejects the null
of a FTP model for all models. In more detail, for the parametrization of the transition
probability [1q(wt1)] in Eq. (6), the test for the non-influence of the trigger-variables in 
the process for the transition probabilities is a test for H0: k00,1 =0 and k11,1 =0. The null 
considers a restricted model where the trigger variables do not influence the transition
probabilities of switching, to and from, the two different price states. Under the null of no
time variation in the transition probabilities, the FTP model is rejected if W 
=2	(log(h)logR(h)) exceeds the v2(2), where log(h) and logR(h) are the log-likelihoods 
of the restricted and unrestricted model. The results for the FTP model indicated a value for
the likelihood of 20.9747.29 The p-values resulting from these tests are reported in the last 
row of Table 3. The hypothesis of a FTP is rejected at 5% for all models. Therefore, our
results show that there is further information embodied in the trigger-variables that accounts
for the transition dynamics from high to low price states.
In order to quantify the effect of a variation of the trigger variables in the
transition probabilities of entering into a price war, we have calculated the marginal28 In the estimation, we have scaled the quantity variables dividing them by 10,000 in order to put all the
variables in a similar scale. This is required for the purpose of facilitating the numerical maximization.
29 The results of the FTP model are not reported in this paper and are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 3
Parameters estimates of the TVTP models
Model 1, DShareENDt1 Model 2, DShare
IB
t1 Model 3, DHHIt1 Model 4, DS¯MP t1 Model 5, DRev
END
t1 Model 6, DRev
IB
t1
log-lik 27.8975 28.5338 27.6838 27.7454 28.4649 28.1910
q 0.5209 (0.0455) 0.5217 (0.0461) 0.5211 (0.0452) 0.5173 (0.0448) 0.5282 (0.0502) 0.5191 (0.0441)
b1 0.1207 (0.0318) 0.1209 (0.0317) 0.1220 (0.0321) 0.1217 (0.0317) 0.1207 (0.0319) 0.1234 (0.0319)
b2 0.0154 (0.0154) 0.0152 (0.0154) 0.0156 (0.0155) 0.0153 (0.0154) 0.0153 (0.0156) 0.0159 (0.0153)
b3 0.0808 (0.0299) 0.0803 (0.0301) 0.0818 (0.0295) 0.0816 (0.0296) 0.0716 (0.0322) 0.0828 (0.0293)
b4 0.0376 (0.0348) 0.0363 (0.0347) 0.0391 (0.0349) 0.0379 (0.0345) 0.0357 (0.0348) 0.0395 (0.0346)
b5 0.2004 (0.0757) 0.2017 (0.0755) 0.2027 (0.0765) 0.2019 (0.0754) 0.2026 (0.0759) 0.2056 (0.0758)
l0 2.6658 (0.0231) 2.6651 (0.0231) 2.665 (0.0231) 2.6658 (0.0229) 2.6643 (0.0235) 2.6647 (0.0228)
l1 1.9289 (0.0512) 1.9255 (0.0509) 1.9247 (0.0520) 1.9260 (0.0505) 1.9369 (0.0531) 1.9209 (0.0508)
k00,0 3.6185 (0.3831) 3.6748 (0.3948) 3.6080 (0.3762) 3.6264 (0.3800) 3.6095 (0.3866) 3.5963 (0.3808)
k11,0 1.7934 (0.4349) 1.8570 (0.4557) 1.7757 (0.4401) 1.7504 (0.4418) 1.8977 (0.5048) 1.9292 (0.4819)
k00,1 13.0737 (14.8481) 12.0412 (10.2657) 42.0927 (74.9304) 0.8752 (0.8404) 1.6093 (1.5004) 2.0324 (3.8287)
k11,1 10.1408 (17.4295) 9.5191 (8.9431) 40.45 (92.9327) 0.1046 (1.9421) 2.8551 (2.1643) 2.9148 (2.6503)
r 0.0373 (0.0029) 0.0374 (0.0029) 0.0374 (0.0029) 0.0373 (0.0029) 0.0371 (0.0030) 0.0373 (0.0029)
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
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Table 4
Marginal effects of the trigger variables on the transition probabilities (based on Model 1, trigger DSharet1
END)
Trigger variable BP St ¼ 1jSt1 ¼ 0; w¯t1
 
Bwt1
1
T
XT
i¼1
BP St ¼ 1jSt1 ¼ 0;wt1ð Þ
Bwt1
DShareENDt1 0.3351 0.3474
DShareIBt1 0.2937 0.3153
DHHIt1 1.0819 1.1059
DS¯MP t1 0.0222 0.0226
DRevENDt1 0.0422 0.0445
DRevIBt1 0.0518 0.0538effect of increases in wt1 on the transition probability [1q(wt1)], evaluated at the
average w¯t1,
BP St ¼ 1jSt1 ¼ 0; w¯t1
 
B w¯t1
;
We have also considered the average marginal effect,
1
T
XT
t¼1
BP St ¼ 1jSt1 ¼ 0;wt1ð Þ
Bwt1
:
This information is provided in Table 4, and it is complemented in Fig. 4, which depicts
the cross plots of the transition probabilities P(St =1|St1=0, wt1) with the trigger
variables associated with changes in firms’ market shares and revenues.
The signs of the marginal effects are consistent with the empirical predictions in Section
3.1. First, the marginal effects of DShareENDt1 and DRev
END
t1 are positive, whereas those of
DShareIBt1 and DRev
IB
t1 are negative. That is, increases in Endesa’s market share and
revenues and reductions in Iberdrola’s market share and revenues, increase the probability
of entering into a price war phase. The sign of DHHIt1 is in agreement with those of
DShareENDt1 and DShare
IB
t1, as an increase in Endesa’s market share and a reduction in
Iberdrola’s market share leads to an increase in industry concentration. Last, the positive
sign of DS¯MPt1 is highly meaningful: in contrast to models of collusion among
uncontracted firms, we find that an increase in prices with respect to their usually
prevailing level increases (rather than decreases) the probability of starting a price war.
Given that a price increase is consistent with Iberdrola’s one-shot bidding incentives, this
seems to suggest that Iberdrola is considered to be the firm most likely to defect from the
collusive agreement.3030 The recent performance of the Spanish electricity market shows that Iberdrola has decided, in the light of our
analysis, to ddefectT forever. In November 2003, Iberdrola proposed to eliminate the CTC payments, even if there 
was still a residual amount of CTCs to be received. In a newspaper article entitled bThe Secret Price War between 
Endesa and IberdrolaQ, Mota (2003) writes: bWhy is Iberdrola opposing the CTCs, apparently against such as 
primary and evident interest as to receive the money that it had been recognized or given by the 
government?. . .because it would hurt Endesa more, but above all, because the end of the CTCs would free 
the market price–now it is capped at 6 PTAS/kWh–in which the Basque generator (Iberdrola) has a larger share 
than it has on the CTCs.Q
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Fig. 4. Cross plots of trigger variables and the probability of starting a price war, P(St=1|St1=0, wt), for
DShareENDt1 , DShare
IB
t1, DRev
END
t1 and DRev
IB
t1.Fig. 5 plots the smoothed probabilities of being in a low state of prices for Model 1,
which uses changes in Endesa’s market share as the trigger variable. Smoothed
probabilities are the inferred probabilities of being in a given state using all the
information available. Though the smoothed probabilities slightly differ for the other
models, they all deliver similar pictures. The classification of the states and the dating of
the price wars is done using the smoothed probabilities. At every point in time, we
calculate a smoothed probability of being in an given state, and then assign that25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250 275 300 325 350
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
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Share Endesa
Fig. 5. Smooth probabilities of being in a price war (based on Model 1, trigger DShareENDt1 ).
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Table 5
Dating of price wars, duration, depth, and generators’ mark-ups in the period before a price war starts (based on
Model 1, trigger DSharet1
END)
Dating Duration (days) Depth (%) MarkupENDt1 (%) Markup
IB
t1 (%)
04/05–13/05 10 44.27 10.18 31.04
14/06–03/07 20 41.21 8.80 15.95
08/09–12/09 5 18.75 19.38 26.77
19/10–26/10 8 34.16 4.63 2.02
20/12–30/12 11 21.69 21.11 41.71observation to one of the regimes according to the highest filtered probability, i.e., we
classify period t as a high-price state if P(St=1|St1=st1, wt, SMPt)b0.5, as a low-price
state if P(St=1|St1=st1, wt, SMPt)N0.5. This rule minimizes the total probability of
misclassification in the sample. We will consider the definition of a price war whenever a
state of low prices is followed by a state of the same nature.
This definition allows a corresponding dating of price wars in the Spanish electricity
market. As can be seen in Table 5, the average duration of a price war ranges from slightly
less than five days to almost three weeks.31 The drops in prices during a price war regime 
with respect to the last collusive period–which we refer to as the depth of the price war–,
are of great magnitude. On average, prices drop 32% and the highest drops in prices attain
values as high as 45%. Furthermore, in line with the models of individual profit
maximizing behavior among contracted firms (Newbery, 1998; Wolak, 2000), during the
price war phase Endesa’s mark-up is negative and Iberdrola’s is positive. However, during
the collusive phase, Endesa’s mark-up becomes positive (Table 6).
Last, Table 7 reports a summary of evaluation statistics for each of the estimated models
based on the predicted residuals. The diagnostic statistics comprise a Chi-square test for
second-order residual error autocorrelation, an F-test for conditional heteroscedasticity of
order two, as well as a Chi-square test for normality. Their corresponding p-values are
reported in the first, second and third rows, respectively. The different models estimated
seem to be a good statistical specification given the diagnostic statistics.
Implicit in our formulation is the assumption that the pattern of prices is characterized
by two different states. However, one could argue that the asymmetry in firms’ deviation
incentives could allow punishment strategies to be tailored to the suspect, leading to three
rather than two regimes. Unfortunately, testing for the number of regimes in a Markov-
switching model is a difficult task. First, the conventional testing approaches to deal with
the number of regimes are not applicable due to the presence of unidentified nuisance
parameters under the null of linearity (that is, the transition probabilities). And second, the
scores associated with the parameters of interest under the alternative hypothesis may be
identically zero under the null. Formal tests of the number of regimes within the Markov-
switching framework employing the standardized likelihood ratio (LR) test designed to31 The results reported in Table 5 rely on the regime classification obtained using the smooth probabilities of the
model where DShareENDt1 is the trigger variable. This regime classification hardly changes across the different
models. Further results on the regime classification using other models can be obtained from the authors upon
request.
22
Table 6
Average markups during collusive and price war periods (based on Model 1, trigger DShareENDt1 )
MarkupEND (%) Markup (%)IB
Collusive periods 18.27 31.80
Price war periods 11.70 4.10deliver (asymptotically) valid inference have been proposed by Davies (1977), Hansen
(1992, 1996) and Garcia (1993). The extension of Hansen’s approach to our model seems
to be impossible to implement computationally (see Ang and Bekaert, 1998) and is
certainly beyond the scope of this paper. Furthermore, it delivers only a bound on the
asymptotic distribution of the standardized LR test. The test is conservative, tending to be
under-sized in practice, and of low power. Nevertheless, we estimated a three regimes’
equation for all the models entertained. A LR test of two regimes against the alternative of
three delivered the following values: 4, 2.01, 10.05, 7.75, 3.11 and 1.79, for Models 1 to 6
as presented in Table 3. Even if we used the upper bound suggested in Davies (1977), the
null of a two states model cannot be rejected against the alternative of three states for all
the models.
4.5. Is the evidence consistent with Green and Porter (1984)?
The regime-switching models of the type pioneered by Green and Porter (1984) (GP)
provide a possible explanation for the evidence reported above (see also Abreu et al.,
1986). In these models, firms move between cooperative and punishment periods (price
wars) as a way to enforce collusive outcomes. Under imperfect monitoring (i.e., imperfect
information about firms’ past actions or market conditions), firms are unable to distinguish
whether changes in the observable variables are due to changes in market conditions or to
cheating by one of the cartel members. Thus, in order to discourage deviations, reversions
to some short-run unprofitable behavior must be employed when one of the observable
variables behaves as if a deviation had occurred.
The Spanish electricity market departs from the classic GP’s formulation in two
respects. First, the underlying games differ, and so do their implications for the patterns of
switches that are consistent with the theory. As analyzed in Section 3, firms’ optimal
deviations in the Spanish electricity market need not necessarily involve price under-
cutting. Hence, a large price reduction, which GP use as trigger, may not always be a goodTable 7
Specification tests
Model 1,
DShareENDt1
Model 2,
DShareIBt1
Model 3,
DHHIt1
Model 4,
DS¯MPt1
Model 5,
DRevENDt1
Model 6,
DRevIBt1
Error autocorrelation 0.75738 0.76678 0.73609 0.71530 0.74595 0.85982
ARCH 0.16598 0.17418 0.18635 0.18900 0.19316 0.18446
Normality 0.93584 0.89554 0.98523 0.98342 0.92794 0.89832
Likelihood test 0.00098 0.00052 0.00121 0.00114 0.00055 0.00073
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signal of cheating; accordingly, it is not clear whether it should be expected to trigger price
wars.
The other difference with respect to GP is related to the information available to the
Spanish electricity producers. In particular, in contrast with GP who assume that only
prices but not quantities are observed, the Spanish electricity producers observe both
aggregate quantities and prices at gate-closure. Nevertheless, this does not imply that the
Spanish electricity producers may perfectly detect their rivals’ potential deviations. First,
the generation coming from the must-run resources (mainly, cogeneration and renewables)
is not known. And second, firms’ available capacities are subject to random shocks, out of
firms’ control (e.g. capacities may suffer random outages, or be increased due to an excess
of run of the river hydro power). This implies that a firm’s departure from any agreed upon
market share may have resulted either from cheating by a rival, or from any of those
random and unobservable factors cited above. Therefore, even if the sources of imperfect
information differ, the Spanish electricity producers are faced with the same kind of signal
extraction problem as in a GP type of model.32
To assess whether the evidence is consistent with GP, we proceed by comparing our 
empirical findings with their main predictions. First, the fact that two distinct price levels 
characterize the time series of prices in the Spanish electricity market confirms GP’s 
prediction that price wars should be observed in equilibrium. Second, the statistical 
significance of the trigger variables is consistent with GP’s prediction that price wars must 
be linked to movements in the trigger variables. Third, since the effects of the triggers 
coincide with the theoretical findings, GP’s prediction that price wars should be more 
likely to occur when the trigger variables move as if a deviation had taken place is 
confirmed. Unfortunately, the lack of data on individual bids does not allow us to test GP’s 
prediction that deviations should not take place in equilibrium. Nevertheless, the 
information contained in Table 5 may shed some light on this issue. It shows that the 
behavior of firms’ mark-ups in the period that triggers the price war is not homogenous 
across the different price wars, probably suggesting that deviations are not taking place (or 
at least, not always in the same direction).
Having said all this, there are other reasons that indicate caution regarding
interpretation of the evidence as support for GP’s model. The incentive structure
embedded in GP’s model requires a high degree of rationality, which cannot be reasonably
expected in a market that has only recently started to operate. Furthermore, firms’ optimal
deviations in GP’s model are symmetric, implying that movements in the trigger variables
do not convey any information about the potential deviator. In our case, the asymmetry in
firms’ deviation incentives should in principle allow punishments to be tailored to the
suspect. The fact that a three-state model is rejected in our data contradicts the use of an32 There is an alternative branch of the literature on collusion in markets subject to variable demand, exemplified
by the models of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991). In these models, which 
assume perfect monitoring, price wars do not arise as equilibrium phenomena. Instead, the sustainability of 
collusion is maintained through smoother price adjustments, which depend on current or future demand 
conditions. However, we believe that perfect monitoring is an unrealistic assumption in the Spanish electricity 
market.
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optimal collusive device, and hence casts some doubts on the applicability of GP’s model
to our data set.
Indeed, there could be several alternative explanations, other than collusion, for the
phenomena that we observe in the Spanish data. For instance, if firms were not pursuing
collusive strategies, the existence of periods of low prices could be accounted for by mixed
strategy pricing or by the lack of coordination on the multiple price equilibria (see von der
Fehr and Harbord, 1993). However, if this were the case, there should be no reason to
observe such a persistence in each price state as we observe in the data. Furthermore, there
should not be a systematic relationship between the trigger variables and the occurrence of
price wars, i.e., their coefficients should be non-significant.5. Conclusions
We have analyzed the dynamic exercise of market power in the Spanish electricity
market during 1998 using daily observations on demand, prices and other variables that
allow us to obtain accurate marginal costs estimates at the firm level. The Spanish
electricity market has interesting institutional features that make this analysis relevant both
for public policy, as well as from a methodological perspective.
As in all decentralized electricity markets, trading in the Spanish electricity market
takes place through a series of daily auctions. Both theory and experience suggest that the
daily repetition of auctions may have a dramatic effect on market performance, as it allows
firms to learn to coordinate their strategies and hence compete less aggressively with each
other over time, through collusive agreements. However, unlike other markets, collusion in
the Spanish electricity market need not result in high price-cost margins, precisely because
the Spanish electricity producers are entitled to earn some regulatory payments, which are
computed in a similar fashion as bContracts for DifferencesQ. The theoretical predictions
imply that an over-contracted firm may find it in its private interest to reduce prices, as this
strategy may lead to an increase in its contract revenues that more than compensates for
the reduction in prices. Thus, even in a static context, the value of firms’ mark-ups does
not provide a precise measure of firms’ ability to exercise market power. To overcome this
difficulty, our analysis has exploited the movements in prices, firms’ market shares and
revenues in order to infer firms’ ability to exercise market power in a dynamic context.
The performance of the Spanish electricity market during 1998 is not consistent with
the predictions of models of individual profit maximizing behavior. In particular, the over-
contracted firm should have produced at prices below marginal costs, and the movements
in prices should have been fully explained by changes in demand and cost conditions.
These observations have led us to conjecture that the Spanish electricity producers may
have been engaged in some kind of tacit agreement that distorted market outcomes from
the predictions of the theories of individual profit maximizing behavior.
Our analysis has been designed to test the above conjecture. In order to identify the
plausible triggers that firms could have used to support collusion, we have first identified
firms’ optimal deviations from a model of joint-profit maximizing behavior. This model
predicts that price wars should be triggered when the market share and revenues of the
under-contracted firm decrease, and those of the over-contracted firm increase. We have25
tested these predictions empirically by modelling the time series of prices as a Markov-
switching process in the mean, with time-varying transition probabilities that depend on
changes in firms’ market shares, revenues, and market prices. The results confirm that the
time series of prices is characterized by two distinct price levels. Furthermore, most of the
triggers considered appear to be significant and report the same signs as those predicted by
the theory. These results offer further support to the claim that the way in which the CTCs
have been computed has had an important impact in firms’ bidding incentives.Acknowledgments
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